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CASES NOTED
plaintiffs were given leave to dismiss"' under Rule 41 (a) (2),2' which provides
for dismissal by order of court upon motion, and specifically provides that
such -dismissal will be without prejudice in the absence of an order to the
contrary.
Requiring plaintiffs to proceed under Rule 41(a) (2) will necessitate
further time and expense on the part of both plaintiff and defendant, appar-
ently conflicting with the spirit of Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, calling for construction of the rules to secure a just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action. The Court's decision
in this ease creates the necessity for a further interpretation of Rule 41 (a) (1)
in each new case that arises as to what is an "advanced stage of a suit."
Charles R. Carman.
REAL PROPERTY -EMINENT DOMAIN-
APPORTIONMENT OF AWARD BETWEEN LESSOR
AND LESSEE
The plaintiff's leased property was taken by the City of Miami Beach
under eminent domain. An offer by the City of $50,000 was accepted
by landlord and tenant, but no express agreement was made as to the
apportionment. Held, payment of the award is to be made to the lessor
as substitution for the land. The lessee's interest is satisfied by a reduction
of the rent equal to the return an investment would bring of the award
in the highest grade securities. Raleigh Operating Co. v. Naglo Corp., 3
Fla. Supp. 111 (1953).*
Although the Florida Constitution guarantees full compensation for
the taking of land by condemnation proceeding,' there have been no
reported cases in Florida determining the apportionment of the award
between lessor and lessee. It cannot be doubted that the lessee has a
definite property interest in the condemned land,2 but there is no uniform
rule applied by all jurisdictions to determine the exact amount to be
granted in the absence of an apportionment agreement in the lease. Full
19. Haney Aluminum, Inc. v. American Cynanimid Co., 203 F.2d 105, 108
(2d Cir. 1953).
20. 'By Order of Court. Except as provided in paragraph (1) of this subdivision
of this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon order
of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a counter
claim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's
motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's objection
unless the counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the court.
Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph is without
prejudice."
*Editor's note: This case is on appeal.
1. FLA. Co NsT. Art. XVI § 29; see Adel] v. Boynton, 95 Fla. 984, 117 So. 507(1928; WE , FLORIDA LAW OF REAL ESTATE 94-95 (1st ed. 1926).
Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875); United States v. 26,699 Acres
of Land, 174 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1949); Korf v. Fleming, 239 Iowa 501, 32 N.W.2d
85 (1934).
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compensation for the taking by eminent domain has been held to be fair
market value," but this term in itself has little meaning, requiring further
criteria. Often, the lease in question may have no market value at allP
Courts faced with the problem of ascertaining the lessee's interest
have applied numerous tests. Twenty-nine states" have applied the "before
and after value rule," holding that the measure of damages for land
taken by eminent domain is the difference between the value of the lease-
hold interest before the taking and the value after the taking. The
difficulties encountered by the use of this rule are in trying to place a
fair market value on the leasehold after condemnation.6 Other courts
have concluded that there is no market value for a lease after condemnation
of the leased property and have applied the "intrinsic value rule," 7 which
in effect uses the lessee's valuation of the property as the basis for
determining the amount of the award. This solution is open to criticism
since too much latitude is left to the discretion of the court.' Still other
courts have resolved the problem on the theory of "deprivation of right,"9
maintaining that every person has the right to remain in undisturbed
possession until the end of his term and damages shall be paid for the
infringement of this right. The actual measurement of such an interest
is again, in the final analysis, left to the discretion of the court.' 0  In
Massachusetts the problem Nas settled by statute which set forth a
detailed formula." In yet other jurisdictions the "use rule" or "business
3. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 155 F.2d 977 (Ist Cir.)
cert. denied, 329 U.S. 774 (1946); Pause v. Atlanta, 98 Ga. 92, 26 S.E. 489
(1896); Matter of Delancy St., 120 A pp. Div. 700, 105 N.Y. Stipp. 779 (Ist Dept. 1907).
4. Pasadena v. Porter, 201 Cal. 381, 257 Pac. 526 (1927); accord, Pierson v.
Leonard Furniture Co., 268 Mich. 507, 256 N.W. 529 (1934).
5. See United States v. 10,245 Acres of Land, 50 F. Supp. 470 (E.D. Wash.
1943); United States v. Welch 217 U.S. 333 (1909); Sharp v. United States, 191 U.S.
341 (1903); Alabama Power 6o. v. Bern, 222 Ala. 20 130 So. 541 (1930); Stockton
v. Morengo, 137 Cal. App. 760, 31 P.2d'467 (1934); Oakland v. Pacific Coast Lumber
& Mill Co., 171 Cal. 392, 153 Pac. 705 (1915), rehearing denied, 172 Cal. 332,
156 Pac. 468 (1916); In re Newton Creek Waterway, 284 N.Y. 493, 31 N.E.2d 916
(1940); Cincinnati v. Smythe, 57 Ohio App. 70, 11 N.E.2d 274 (1937); Muskingum
W.C. Dist. v. laynes, 55 Ohio App. 284, 9 N.E.2d 705 (1937).
6. ibid. No other concIlusion can be reached.
7. Hayes v. Atlanta, 1 Ga. App. 25, 57 S.E. 1087 (1907); Koef v. Fleming,
239 Iowa 501, 32 N.\W.2d 85 (1948); see Hale, Value in Condemnation Cases. 31
COL. L. REv. 1 (1931).
8. Ibid.
9. McMillian Printing Co. v. Pittsburgh Ry., 216 Pa. St. 504, 65 AtI. 1091
(1907); accord, North Coast Ry. v. Kraft Co., 63 W\ash. 250, 115 Pae. 97 (1911); cf.
Uhland Club v. Shupback, 168 Mass. 430, 47 N.E. 113 (1897); see Note, 3 Mo. L. Rev.
203 1938).
10. Ibid.
11. MAss. CEN. LAWS c. 79 § 24 (1921). The pertinent part of this statute
is as follows: "If a tenant for life or for years and the remainderman or reversioner
sustain damages [throngh condemnation] . . . entire damages . . . shall be paid to
I ..any person whom the parties may appoint, and be held in trust by him for their
benefit according to their respective interests. The trustee shall, from the income
thereof, pay to the reversioner ... the value of any annual rent . ..which would,
but for such ... [taking], have been payable by the tenant, and the balance thereof
to such tenant during the period for which his estate was limited, and upon its
termination, he shall pay the principal to the reversioner ...."
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value theory" 12 has been applied. Under this rule the fair market value is
based on what use the lessee makes of his leasehold, excluding recovery
for expectant profits. While testimony is taken by appraisers the court
still has wide discretion in determining the actual amount of the award.
The "investment securities rule"13 which was applied in the instant
case entails giving the full award to the lessor, in contrast to other
methods where the court apportions the award between the parties at the
time of the judgment. 4 The lessor must invest the award in highest
grade securities and the lessee gets the interest therefrom during the
unexpired term of the lease. However, investment of the award was not
decreed in the principal case because the lessee's interest was substantially
protected since the rental payments far exceeded the return from the in-
vestment. The advantage of the "investment securities rule" is that the
court does not get involved in a maze of technicalities and formulas. 15 The
only scale that is applicable is the economic change in the security market,
and this is guarded against by the court retaining jurisdiction as was
done in the instant case, where the chancellor set the amount temporarily
at three and one-half per cent. This method removes a high percentage
of the "crystal gazing."'1  A disadvantage of this, or any fixed rule, is
that it is arbitrary and does not take into account other equitable factors
such as the premium value placed on commercial property as distinguished
from residential property.1t
It is difficult to see how any one rule can fill the need or supply the
answer in apportionment disputes. Each case should be taken on its own
merits. It is suggested that those contracting in real estate should provide
for apportionment of award in the' event of condemnation in order to
avoid the effect of a court decision in this involved and nebulous area.
F. Stewart Elliott.
TORTS -FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION
Anilnonium nitrate fertilizer stored in vessels in Texas City harbor
exploded, causing 560 deaths and extensive property damage. An action
against the United States' alleged Covernment liability for the negligence
of its employees in manufacturing, packing and shipping the fertilizer.
12. Pasadina v. Porter, 201 Cal. 381, 257 Pac. 526 (1927); Bales v. Wichita
Midland Ry., 92 Kan. 771, 141 Pac. 1009 (1914).
13. In re Pfleges, L.R. 6 Eq. 426 (1868); cf. Matter of Central Park Coxnm'rs, 54
How. Prac. 313 (N.Y. 1873); see Note, 40 HARv. L. REV. 1135 (1927).
14. See note 5 supra.
15. See note 11 suqra.
16. Sce Note, 48 HARV. L. REV. 682 (1935).
17. See Comment, 33 Micii. L. REV. 1087 (1935).
1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2412, 2671-80 (Supp.
1952) (Federal Torts Claims Act).
2. In re Texas City Disaster Litigation, 197 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1952).
